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PREFACE
I am pleased and deeply honored to introduce this, the Public Contract Law
Journal’s first international special-subject issue.
First, of course, we need to turn to the obvious question: Why an international
issue, for a journal (and an ABA section, for that matter) that has traditionally
focused on federal, state, and local procurement? The answer, of course, is that
the broader world of procurement is rapidly changing, as the world seems to grow
smaller by the day.
The gathering changes in international law will impact U.S. public procure-
ment on a day-to-day basis, as the United States enters into more bilateral and
plurilateral treaties that govern procurement practices, and as those treaties’
norms become more tightly bound to the U.S. regulatory regime. In a few short
years, none of us should be surprised if foreign vendors are bringing protests in
U.S. forums, grounded not in the Federal Acquisition Regulation but rather in
international commitments to open U.S. procurement markets (including, in
some instances, state and local markets) to competition from the United States’
trusted trading partners. This volume, with essays on new treaties and harmoni-
zation initiatives around the world, points the way forward to that future.
At the same time, U.S. exporters, for their part, are looking abroad for emerg-
ing opportunities in global markets. These new initiatives present U.S. lawyers
with a stark choice: U.S. procurement attorneys can either broaden their practices
with their clients’ global ambitions or remain rooted here in the United States.
My guess is that they’ll choose the more challenging path; Americans always have.
This issue of the Public Contract Law Journal, which includes essays on many
different foreign procurement systems, is a first step towards an expanded span
of inquiry for the Journal, as we anticipate and accommodate our readers’ needs
for a wider window on procurement systems around the world.
Beyond issues of international and foreign law, we have tried in this issue to
open the way to serious comparative assessments of public procurement law. One
vital aspect of comparative law is to look abroad to better understand one’s own
laws. At a time when U.S. procurement law seems to be in a funk, caught between
waves of reform, looking abroad to other systems for lessons for our own may be
the best medicine. Our hope, then, is that this issue of the Journal will help show
the way forward for improvements in the procurement system here in the United
States.
Finally comes the praise for assembling this special issue, much of which goes
to Rebecca Pearson, who steered this volume for over a year, and to our soon-
departing student editor-in-chief Adelicia Cliffe Taylor, who has worked so hard
on this issue with the GWU Law student staff. Were it not for them, this volume
would not exist, and the procurement community owes them a great debt.
In this same vein, I would like to close on a personal note. In the coming
months, Carl Vacketta, who has headed the Journal through many years of ex-
traordinary growth, will be passing the reins to Karen Manos. All of us in the
procurement bar owe Carl a great deal for those years of hard work. Through his
cheerful leadership and thoughtful appreciation for scholarship, he has helped
make the Journal what we all hope it will be for a very long time: one of the
world’s leading forums for exchanging ideas about public procurement law. From
all of us, a very heartfelt thank you, Carl.
Christopher Yukins
The George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
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SYNOPSIS
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has commissioned a working group, with delegations from
many industrialized and developing nations, to reform and update the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Ser-
vices. The working group is currently reviewing reforms on a number of
fronts. This essay focuses on three areas of reform in particular—electronic
communications, electronic reverse auctions, and unrealistically low bidding—
to gauge whether lessons from the UNCITRAL debate may be useful for
reform in the U.S. procurement system. As the essay reflects, the international
debate surrounding UNCITRAL reform does in fact yield many lessons for
U.S. policymakers. Indeed, the analysis suggests that the U.S. system may be
at a point where it would be irresponsible not to consider comparative lessons
from reforms abroad, to ensure that U.S. procurement policy draws thought-
fully upon lessons learned from other procurement systems around the world.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2004, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has been working to update the 1994 UNCITRAL Model
Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (the “Model Pro-
458 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 35, No. 3 • Spring 2006
curement Law”).1 UNCITRAL has entrusted that reform effort to a working
group, which began its work in Vienna in August–September 2004,2 continued
in New York in April 2005,3 and reconvened in Vienna in November 2005.4
The next scheduled meeting of the working group is to be in New York in
April 2006. What is striking about the UNCITRAL reform effort is not that
U.S. procurement law has much to contribute to the working group (that is
hardly surprising, given many decades of experience in the U.S. procurement
system5), but instead that the UNCITRAL debate has so much to offer U.S.
procurement reform. To show why, this essay reviews three areas of focus in
the current UNCITRAL effort: electronic communications, electronic re-
verse auctions, and abnormally low (or “unrealistically low”) bidding. In each
case, as the discussion below reflects, the international reform effort yields
important lessons for the United States. What this suggests, then, is that as
procurement grows more international, it may prove irresponsible not to con-
sider lessons from abroad if we are to build sensible reforms in the U.S.
procurement system.
1. For background on the 1994 model law, U.N. Doc. No. A/49/17 and Corr. 1 annex I, see
James J. Myers, The New UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement, 23 Pub. Cont. L.J. 267 (1994).
References to the UnitedNations documents throughout this article (the “A/– series” documents)
are to the working papers and reports of UNCITRAL Working Group I, available at http://
www.uncitral.org (specifically http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/
1Procurement.html). For previous discussions of the UNCITRAL developments, see DonWal-
lace’s essay on UNCITRAL: in this issue, and Christopher R. Yukins & Don Wallace Jr.,
UNCITRAL Considers Electronic Reverse Auctions, as Comparative Public Procurement Comes of Age
in the United States, 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 183 (2005); Christopher R. Yukins et al.,
UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law: Reforming Electronic Procurement, Reverse Auctions, and
Framework Agreements, 40 Procurement Law. 12 (Winter 2005) (Am. Bar Ass’n); Don Wallace
Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, UNCITRAL’s Model Procurement Law: Changes on the Horizon, 81
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, Mar. 23, 2004. Drafts of those earlier pieces are generally
available on the Social Science Research Network website, http://www.ssrn.com. This essay is
based in part on earlier technical reports on the November 2005 meeting of the UNCITRAL
working group, prepared with Don Wallace Jr. and Jason Matechak for the American Bar As-
sociation’s Section of International Law (for an upcoming issue of the International Lawyer), and
with Professor Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, Re´vision de la Loi Type sur les Marche´s Publics de la
CNUDCI, Cont. Pub., No. 51, Jan. 2006. The author gratefully acknowledges Daniel Gordon
for his assistance with the latter report, and Adelicia Cliffe Taylor, of the Public Contract Law
Journal, for her patient help with this essay. Any errors herein are, of course, the author’s own.
2. See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group I (Procurement) on the Work of Its Sixth Session
(Vienna, 30 August–3 September 2004), U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/568 (Sept. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procurement.html.
3. See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group I (Procurement) on the Work of Its Seventh Session
(New York, 4–8 April 2005), U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/575 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procurement.html.
4. See UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group I (Procurement) on the Work of Its Eighth Session
(Vienna, 7–11 November 2005), U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590 (Nov. 18, 2005) (draft, on file
with author), to be available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/
1Procurement.html.
5. See, e.g., Anne Janet DeAses, Note, Developing Countries: Increasing Transparency and Other
Methods of Eliminating Corruption in the Public Procurement Process, 34 Pub. Cont. L.J. 553 (2005)
(discussing U.S. lessons for anticorruption efforts worldwide).
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II. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE AND “ACCESSIBILITY”
The first topic taken up by the Working Group was electronic commu-
nications in public procurement. This is not a controversial issue, as many
procurement processes, especially in the developed world, have shifted to
electronic media, most often the Internet. The purposes of this initiative un-
der the Model Procurement Law are to bring the model law up to date and,
even if only indirectly, to encourage nations that rely on the Model Procure-
ment Law to use electronic communications for procurement.
In undertaking this initiative, theWorking Group has deferred to the work
being done under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce.6
In keeping with the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, the proposed
changes to the Model Law are to reflect the principles of functional equivalence
between electronic communications and traditional paper-based transactions
and technological neutrality between different types of technology solutions.7
Because the UNCITRAL procurement law will largely defer to the
UNCITRAL initiatives in electronic commerce, most of the proposed
changes regarding electronic communications are not to be in the
UNCITRAL Model Law itself,8 but instead are to go to the accompanying
Guide to Enactment for the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Guide to Enactment
would note that, at the time the Model Law was adopted in 1994, electronic
communications were still not broadly used in procurement.9 That has changed,
and the Guide to Enactment would be updated to ensure that electronic com-
munications are adopted smoothly, without causing discrimination among
vendors due to lack of access; without threatening basic principles of security,
confidentiality, and authenticity in electronic communications; and without
undermining existing socioeconomic goals in procurement.10 And the pro-
posed changes to the Model Procurement Law itself would mean that “any
requirement for writing, for a record or for a meeting” under the Model
Procurement Law could be met using electronic communications.11
To update the Model Procurement Law to accommodate electronic com-
merce, the Working Group was presented with three possible amendments
6. Available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/1996
Model.html.
7. See UNCITRAL, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods,
Construction and Services—Drafting Materials Addressing the Use of Electronic Communications in
Public Procurement—Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/GW.I/WP.38, ¶¶ 14–17 ( July
19, 2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procure
ment.html; U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 19 (citing U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/575,
supra note 3, ¶ 12).
8. Available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-pro
cure.pdf.
9. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.38, supra note 7, ¶ 23.
10. Id., ¶¶ 1–4.
11. Id., ¶ 13.
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to the Model Procurement Law. All three variants would confirm that elec-
tronic means of communication are sufficient for public procurement, and all
three would caution that electronic means will not, in practice, work to dis-
criminate against certain vendors.12 Of the three, the version that gained the
most support at the Vienna meeting13 read as follows:
Article 4 bis. Functional equivalence of all methods of communicating, publishing,
exchanging or storing information or documents
(1) Any provision of this Law related to writing, to a record or to a meeting shall
be interpreted to include electronic, optical or comparable means, [including, but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex
or telecopy] [provided that the enacting State or procuring entity is satisfied that such
use:
(a) [Does not represent an obstacle to the procurement process] [uses means of
communication generally available];
(b) Promotes economy and efficiency in the procurement process; and
(c) Will not result in discrimination among or against potential suppliers or con-
tractors or otherwise substantially limit competition] [provided that the enacting
State or procuring entity is satisfied that such use complies with the accessibility
standards contained in article [article 4 bis or 5 bis].] . . .14
Controversy arose on this proposed provision at theNovember 2005meet-
ing. Because the italicized language seems to leave it to the procuring agency
to assess the discriminatory impact that electronic communications might
have (against new or foreign bidders, for example), the proposed languagewas
criticized by some in the Working Group. The proposed language might be
read to vest agencies with subjective authority to determine whether a pro-
posed means of electronic communication will not raise a barrier to entry,
will promote efficiency and economy, and will not have a discriminatory im-
pact on prospective vendors. This discretionary authority might be read too
broadly in a subsequent bid challenge (protest); this could, in practice, insulate
(for example) a state’s discriminatory efforts to use electronic communications
to exclude vendors.15
At the earlier April 2005 meeting in New York, the Working Group con-
cluded that the procuring entity (i.e., agency) should have the right to select
the form of communication to be used (electronic or nonelectronic), and that
the procuring entity should not have to justify its choice.16 Those points were,
at the time, relatively uncontroversial. By adding the proposed text outlined
above, which would vest additional, subjective discretion in the procuring
entity to determine whether the electronic means chosen were truly “acces-
12. See id., ¶ 26.
13. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 22.
14. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.38, supra note 7, ¶¶ 25, 28 (emphasis added). The
version quoted above was presented as “Variant B.”
15. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 24.
16. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/575, supra note 3, ¶¶ 32–33.
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sible,” the proposed language may go too far: it could allow the procuring
entity to choose the means of communication, without justification, and
would allow the procuring entity to reach a subjective (and presumably un-
documented) conclusion as to whether those communications were truly “ac-
cessible.” As a result of discussions held at the November 2005 meeting, the
Working Group concluded that it may be better to delete the language ital-
icized above, so that an objective test (rather than the procuring agency’s sub-
jective belief ) would govern.17 Final language will be addressed at theWorking
Group’s meeting in April 2006, in New York.
What does the UNCITRAL debate have to teach the U.S. procurement
system? It shows that there was a gap in the reforms of the 1990s, when, to
accommodate the ill-fated Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FAC-
NET) launched by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994,18 the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was amended to allow for electronic
communications in procurement.19 While subsequent decisions from the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) have confirmed agencies’ reasonable
discretion to choose electronic methods of procurement,20 and the GAO has
generally protected agencies from liability for failures in electronic procure-
ment,21 the statutes, regulations, and subsequent decisions have never truly
resolved the issue addressed by the UNCITRAL working group: that the
choice of electronic means in procurementmay well discriminate against some
potential offerors in a deeply anticompetitive way.
That discriminatory issue—the anticompetitive impact of using newmodes
of electronic procurement—may well come to a head with encryption tech-
nologies, an issue that the GAO and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (the
main U.S. bid challenge forums) have not yet had to address.22 Here, the
17. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 24.
18. 41 U.S.C. § 426(a) (2000) (“The head of each executive agency, after consulting with the
Administrator, shall establish, maintain, and use, to the maximum extent that is practicable and
cost-effective, procedures and processes that employ electronic commerce in the conduct and
administration of its procurement system.”); see Christopher R. Yukins, FACNET: Has Congress
Struck a Mortal Blow? Wash. Tech., Jan. 12, 1998; Christopher R. Yukins, Managing Electronic
Commerce on the Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET), 27:1 Nat. Cont. Mgt. J.
(1996).
19. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 64,916 (1997) (final rule liberalizing regulations regarding electronic
commerce in federal procurement).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth Indus. Specialties, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-277833, Nov. 25, 1997,
97-2 CPD ¶ 151 (“agencies generally . . . have found that, with advances in information tech-
nology, the use of an electronic format can be more efficient than the use of a paper format
and does not unduly restrict competition”); NuWestern USA Constructors, Inc., Comp. Gen.
B-275514, Feb. 27, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 90 (same); Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.—Use of Elec.
Data Interchange Tech. to Create Valid Obligations, Comp. Gen. B-245714, Dec. 13, 1991, 96-2
CPD ¶ 225 (agencies may use electronic data interchange and other electronic means to “sign”
binding contracts).
21. See, e.g., Am. Material Handling, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-281556, Feb. 24, 1999, 99-1 CPD
¶ 46. But cf. Jack Faucett Assocs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-279347, June 3, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 155
(protest sustained because not adequate notice of electronic procurement).
22. Cf.KenwoodUSACorp., Comp.Gen. B-294638, B-294638.2, B-294638.3, Nov. 29, 2004,
2004 CPD ¶ 239 (deferred to agency, finding encryption card requirements in radio equipment
not unduly restrictive).
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UNCITRAL working group’s discussion was instructive, for the working
group focused on the practical problems in assuring that vendors have access
to new electronic procurement systems, which is precisely the problem likely
to arise as U.S. agencies secure their procurement systems with sophisticated
encryption technologies.
A working paper from the UNCITRAL Secretariat had suggested23 that,
if a procuring entity uses a particular technology for procurement, the “pro-
curing entity should provide it openly and without charge,” and the procuring
entity “should ensure that any electronic systems are fully compatible (or
interoperable) with those in general use.” The members of the UNCITRAL
working group noted that, while laudable, these goals may be overly ambi-
tious. It is probably inappropriate to suggest that any software or tools used
be available “without charge,”24 and it may prove impossible, from a drafting
standpoint, to define what “fully compatible”(or “interoperable”)means.While
no language was fixed at the November 2005 UNCITRAL working group
meeting,25 the consensus seemed to be that it may be more prudent simply to
suggest in the Guide to Enactment caution that proprietary, incompatible soft-
ware systems may pose unreasonable barriers to competition.
The UNCITRAL deliberations suggest a future pathway for U.S. pro-
curement, when U.S. policymakers come to grapple—as they almost certainly
will—with the anticompetitive ramifications of encryption. Much of the in-
formation transferred electronically in U.S. procurement today is unencrypted
and is exchanged through open websites (such as www.fedbizopps.gov, the
central point of entry for business opportunities) or through simple electronic
mail messages. Agencies across the Federal Government are seeking out so-
lutions to secure their electronic procurement systems. In doing so, U.S. pol-
icymakers favor technology neutrality, so that U.S. systems are not bound to
any particular technical solution that may sink into obsolescence. The U.S.
policymakers’ cautious approach, founded on technology neutrality, is con-
sistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce,26 and
with U.S. practice under the E-SIGN Act,27 the Uniform Electronic Trans-
actions Act (UETA),28 and federal procurement law under the Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation.29
At some point, however, U.S. policymakers probably will have to surrender
a measure of technology neutrality, and to embrace some common form of
23. UNCITRAL, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Con-
struction and Services—Drafting Materials Addressing the Use of Electronic Communications in Public
Procurement, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.38/Add. 1, ¶ 5 ( July 19, 2005), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procurement.html.
24. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 41.
25. See id., ¶ 33.
26. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.38/Add. 1, supra note 23, ¶¶ 13–15.
27. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq. (2000)).
28. Available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm.
29. See, e.g., Richard Vacura & Christopher R. Yukins, Emerging Legal Issues in DOD’s Shift to
E-Business, 43:3 Gov’t Contractor (2001).
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electronic encryption, to secure procurement processes. The United States,30
like other countries,31 may well adopt digital signatures, using a technology
known as “public key infrastructure” or PKI, as the encryption method of
choice for federal procurement.32 In doing so, however, U.S. policymakers
will have to grapple with the discriminatory, anticompetitive impact that their
choice of PKI technology—a complex technology, with significant attendant
costs and burdens33—may have on the procurement process. Encryption using
PKI is expensive and difficult, and the PKI initiative, in practice, may damage
competition by driving potential commercial vendors away from the federal
market. In assessing that question, U.S. policymakers will be able to draw on
the UNCITRAL working group’s preliminary assessment that, while it may
well be impractical to provide all vendors with free access to the chosen en-
cryption technology, it is imperative to recognize the barriers to competition
that a new technology may raise, and to weigh the benefits of that technology
against the anticompetitive impacts.
The lessons learned from UNCITRAL thus will open a new aspect of the
U.S. policy debate over securing electronic procurement, a debate that to date
has focused much more narrowly on agencies’ direct costs of implementing
electronic security34 and has tended to ignore the broader costs of electronic
barriers to competition. The UNCITRAL lessons also point to practical les-
sons from other nations that have grappled with these same issues of electronic
procurement; those comparative lessons from abroad will make it easier for
U.S. policymakers to weigh the benefits, and competitive costs, of secure
electronic procurement.35 The UNCITRAL effort thus opens the door to a
30. See generally Regina Marie Jennings, The Challenges Facing E-Government Contracting:
Are They Insurmountable? at 57–67 ( Jan. 2006) (thesis on file with the library at The George
Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C.).
31. See, e.g., Hilde Van Eylen et al., Transborder eProcurement Study: Public
eProcurement Initiatives and Experiences—Borders and Enablers 17 (2002) (study report
for the European Commission’s Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services to
Public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens (IDABC), which reviews security initiatives in
electronic procurement systems around the world), available at http://europa.eu.int/idabc/servlets/
Doc?id!22188; Richard Bray, IT Security Becomes Imperative, Summit, Dec. 2001 (discussing
Canada’s decision to use public key infrastructure technology), available at http://www.summit
connects.com/Articles_Columns/Summit_Columns/2001/1201/1201_wireddotgov.htm.
32. See Statement of Linda D. Koontz, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO No. 05-84T,
Smart Card Usage Is Advancing Among Federal Agencies, Including the Department of Veterans Affairs
(Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0584t.pdf.
33. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAONo. 04-1023R, letter to Hon. TomDavis,
Chairman, Comm. on Gov’t Reform, House of Representatives, Public Key Infrastructure: Ex-
amples of Risks and Internal Control Objectives Associated with Certification Authorities (Aug. 10, 2004)
(discussing costs and benefits of using internal government infrastructure rather than sourcing
PKI services from private sector), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041023r.pdf.
34. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., DoD PKI Road Map (2000) (outlining strategy for Defense
Department’s PKI implementation), available at http://www.dod.mil/nii/org/sio/ia/pki/PKI_
Roadmap.pdf;Office of Mgmt.& Budget, Federal Information SecurityManagementAct
(FISMA)—2004 Report to Congress (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/2004_fisma_report.pdf.
35. For case studies in electronic procurement by member states of the European Union, see
the website of the IDABC, at http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/chapter/197.
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much more holistic policy analysis for U.S. procurement, one that draws on
lessons learned from around the world.
III. ELECTRONIC REVERSE AUCTIONS
Probably the most controversial issue taken up at the UNCITRAL work-
ing group meeting of November 2005 was “electronic reverse auctions,” on-
line auctions through which vendors compete to provide lower prices to buy-
ers.36 This issue, which has been pending beforeUNCITRAL for some time,37
raises serious issues related to competition, transparency, and the collateral
impacts of reverse auctions. As with electronic procurement more generally,
discussed above, and “unrealistic” bidding, discussed below, though the
UNCITRAL debate over reverse auctions certainly does not provide all the
answers for U.S. procurement policy, the UNCITRAL debate does point the
way forward by suggesting the right questions.
The European Union has promulgated directives that address electronic
reverse auctions, and the UNCITRAL initiative is very much an outgrowth
of the European regulation.38 The United States, however, remains in a reg-
ulatory limbo regarding reverse auctions. Although U.S. regulators published
a request for comments on electronic reverse auctions in 2000,39 and the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget has issued guidance encouraging the use
of reverse auctions, no governmentwide regulations for reverse auctions have
ever been published in the U.S. system. The impasse is likely due, at least in
part, to intense industry criticism of reverse auctions,40 and to a real uncer-
tainty among government officials as to how to regulate reverse auctions.This
uncertainty has left a regulatory gap and has allowed hundreds of reverse
36. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, Electronic Reverse Auctions Under the EC Public Procurement Rules:
Current Possibilities and Future Prospects, 6 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 299 (2002).
37. See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins & DonWallace Jr.,UNCITRAL Considers Electronic Reverse
Auctions, as Comparative Public Procurement Comes of Age in the U.S., 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev.
183 (2005) (draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id!711847);
UNCITRAL, Comparative Study of Practical Experience with the Use of Electronic (Reverse) Auctions
in Public Procurement, U.N. Docs. Nos. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.35 & Add. 1 (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/1Procurement.html.
38. One open question is whether reverse auctions will become part of the upcoming rene-
gotiation of the Government Procurement Agreement in the World Trade Organization. See
UNCITRAL, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction
and Services—Drafting Materials for the Use of Electronic Reverse Auctions in Public Procurement—
Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40, at 18 n.2 (Aug. 5, 2005) (“The
Secretariat has been advised in consultations with the World Trade Organization that there is
as yet no decision as to whether electronic reverse auctions will be included in the revised text
of the GPA.”), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/
1Procurement.html.
39. See 65 Fed. Reg. 65,232 (Oct. 31, 2000) (request for comments on whether regulation of
electronic reverse auctions is necessary or appropriate).
40. See, e.g., Press Release, AssociatedGen. Contractors, AGCRaises SeriousQuestionsAbout
Reverse Auctions (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.agc.org/content/public/PDF/Press_
Releases/2003/09-16-03b.pdf.
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auctions to proliferate across the U.S. procurement system,41 unguided and
unregulated. Left unregulated, reverse auctions in the U.S. federal system
have spawned a number of practices that raise concerns under fundamental
principles of U.S. procurement law.
Congress recently stepped into this regulatory void, if only to sound a
cautionary bell. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee, in its version
of the defense authorization act for fiscal year 2006, H.R. 1815, originally
incorporated a provision from a bill sponsored by Representative Tom Davis
(R-Virginia), the proposed Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA),
H.R. 2067, which would have specifically required agencies to use commercial
online procurement services, including reverse auctions, “to the maximum
extent practicable.”42 That provision, which had strong support from certain
41. Recently the U.S. General Services Administration, the primary centralized purchasing
agency in the U.S. procurement system, has announced that it will work with a third-party reverse
auction services provider to allow agencies to make broader use of electronic reverse auctions.
See, e.g., Michael Hardy, GSA Taps FedBid for Reverse Auctions, Fed. Comp. Week, Jan. 11, 2006,
available at http://www.fcw.com.
42. The House reported the following language in the version of H.R. 1815 that was sent to
the Senate in May 2005:
SEC. 812. USE OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE ONLINE SERVICES FOR FED-
ERAL PROCUREMENT OF COMMERCIAL ITEMS.
(a) Amendment to the Federal Acquisition Regulation—Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be revised to include
provisions that require the head of an executive agency, to the maximum extent practicable, to
use commercially available online procurement services to purchase commercial items, includ-
ing those procurement services that allow the agency to conduct reverse auctions.
(b) Report—Not later than one year after the revisions to the Federal AcquisitionRegulation
are issued pursuant to subsection (a), the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy shall
submit to the Committees on Governmental Affairs and Homeland Security and on Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committees on Government Reform and on Armed Services
of the House of Representatives a report on the use of commercially available online procure-
ment services. The report shall include—
(1) a list of the executive agencies that have used commercially available online procure-
ment services, and the number of times each has so used such services;
(2) a list of the types of commercially available online procurement services used by each
executive agency and the dollar value of the procurements conducted through each type of
commercially available online procurement service; and
(3) the Administrator’s recommendations for further encouraging the use of commercially
available online procurement services, particularly those that afford the FederalGovernment
the opportunity to conduct reverse auctions.
(c) Definitions—In this section:
(1) The term “commercially available online procurement services,” with respect to pro-
curement by executive agencies, includes reverse auctions and other services accessible on
the Internet that allow executive agencies to purchase commercial items from electronic
catalogs and offerors to bid for delivery orders of such items.
(2) The term “reverse auction,” with respect to procurement by executive agencies, means
a method of soliciting offers on the Internet for commercial items, not including
construction-related services, in which—
(A) firms compete against each other on the Internet in real time and in an open and
interactive environment; and
(B) each firm’s identity and pricing are safeguarded.
(3) The term “Federal Acquisition Regulation” means the single Government-wide pro-
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providers of reverse auction services, was ultimately diluted in the conference
between House and Senate negotiators (the Senate’s version of the defense
authorization bill had included no similar provision). The final conference
report took a much more cautious approach, and merely called for a study of
online procurement services, including reverse auctions:
Use of commercially available online services for federal procurement of commercial items
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 812) that would require the use of
commercially available online procurement services, including reverse auction ser-
vices, to purchase commercial items to the maximum extent practicable.
The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.
The House recedes.
The conferees note that online procurement services, such as reverse auction ser-
vices, are appropriate for the acquisition of some types of commercial items, but
may not be suitable for others. For example, items that call for technical solutions,
require modification, or will be acquired on a basis other than low-cost are unlikely
to be suited to acquisition through reverse auction methods. There may be cases
in which the use of commercially available online procurement services could limit
access to federal agency contracts.
The conferees direct the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, in con-
sultation with the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council established pursuant to
section 25 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 421), to
review the use of online procurement services, such as reverse auction services, and
identify: (1) types of commercial item procurements that are suitable for the use of
such services; and (2) features that should be provided by online procurement ser-
vices that are used by federal agencies.43
To respond to Congress’s demand for direction in this area—and to break
out of the current regulatory limbo—U.S. policymakers will be able to draw
on the work of the UNCITRAL working group, and on many nations’ on-
going experience with reverse auctions.
As the UNCITRAL working group began its discussion of reverse auctions
in November 2005,44 there were several points of concern. The first issue was
structural: should reverse auctions be erected as a separate “method” of pro-
curement, or should electronic reverse auctions simply serve as a tool to im-
prove pricing under existing procurement methods, such as sealed bidding and
negotiations. Those who favored the working group’s consensus approach—
curement regulation issued in accordance with sections 6 and 25 of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 405 and 421).
(4) The terms “executive agency,” “commercial item,” and “procurement” have themean-
ings provided those terms in section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41
U.S.C. 403 et seq.).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 109-360, at 769–70 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 164 Cong. Rec.
H12739, H13100. The conference report accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2006, which was signed into law by President Bush on January 6, 2006, as Public
Law No. 109-163.
44. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40, supra note 38, ¶ 6; U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/
590, supra note 4, ¶ 64.
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who favored making electronic reverse auctions a distinct “method” of pro-
curement—argued that insinuating reverse auctions into other methods of
procurement could undermine the careful protections (for competition and
transparency) built into those other methods.45 It is worth noting, though,
that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has addressed this issue in its own
pilot study of reverse auctions and has concluded that reverse auctions should
not be considered a distinct type of procurement, but instead should be used
as a complementary part of other procurement methods.46
Discussion at the November 2005 working group meeting, based on pro-
posals from the UNCITRAL Secretariat,47 centered on the following points,
all of which are directly relevant to U.S. policy regarding reverse auctions:
• Limiting reverse auctions to procurements where “precise” specifications can be
achieved: The UNCITRAL Secretariat’s proposed text suggested that
electronic reverse auctions should be used only where “precise [and ac-
curate] specifications” can be generated.48 This followed the language of
the European directives, for example Article 54 of Directive 2004/18/
EC, which says that electronic auctions may be used “when the contract
specifications can be established with precision.”49 In fact, however, this
requirement for “precision” in specifications is the same prerequisite that
should apply to any procurement using sealed bids: unless the specifi-
cations are well-defined, competition will be badly impaired. The im-
portant lesson for U.S. policymakers, however, is that the converse is
45. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 65.
46. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final Report Regarding the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Pilot Program on Reverse Auctioning, § 1, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.agc.
org/page.ww?section!Reverse"Auctions"Resource"Center&name!Reverse"Auctions"
Resource"Center.
47. The central proposed text would have provided:
Article 19 bis. Conditions for use of electronic reverse auctions
(1) (Subject to approval by . . . (the enacting State designates an organ to issue the approval),)
a procuring entity may engage in procurement by means of an electronic reverse auction in
accordance with article 47 bis and ter,* in the following circumstances:
a. Where it is feasible for the procuring entity to formulate detailed [, and] precise [and
accurate] specifications for the goods [construction or services] such that homogeneity in
the procurement can be achieved {;
b. Where there is a competitive market of at least [ten] suppliers or contractors [that are
anticipated to be qualified to participate in the electronic reverse auction]; and]
c. The goods [, construction or services] to be procured are [standardized] [standard prod-
ucts] [commodities], [[such that] [and] the price [and other quantifiable criteria expressed in
figures or percentages] thereof [is] [are] the only [criterion] [criteria] to be used in deter-
mining the successful bid] [[such that] [and] all criteria that are to be submitted and evaluated
in the auction can be evaluated automatically].
U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40, supra note 38, ¶ 10 (brackets in original).
48. The proposed UNCITRAL language, see supra note 47, also would have limited electronic
reverse auctions to those situations where there are “standard” or “standardized” products.
49. Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
on the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply
Contracts and Public Service Contracts, art. 54, 134 O.J. 114, 148 (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/daj/marches_publics/ppn/ppn-anglais/07_2004-18e.pdf.
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also true: as Congress suggested in the recent conference report, where
there are alternative technical solutions for a given problem (and thus
not “homogeneity” in the technical specifications), a reverse auction that
binds the procuring entity to only one technical solution may not be the
optimal choice, however beguiling that auction may be because of its
promise of reduced prices.50
• Ensuring adequate competition in reverse auctions: In a break with the Eu-
ropean directives, which include no such minimum benchmark for com-
petition, the proposed UNCITRAL text would have limited reverse auc-
tions to those situations where there is a “competitive market of at least
[ten] suppliers or contractors [that are anticipated to be qualified to par-
ticipate in the electronic reverse auction].” Several working group par-
ticipants endorsed this approach, for a more robust market suggests that
more cost information will be available to both suppliers and govern-
ment officials, which will reduce the risks of unreasonably high pricing
and below-cost (or “unrealistic”) bidding (which poses a performance
risk for the Government51). A more robust market also reduces the risk
of price signaling through the auction. Finally, the proposed approach,
which would have turned on contracting officials’ reasonable expecta-
tions of the number of prospective bidders in the market, was viewed as
preferable to relying on contracting officials’ subjective assessment of
whether there is a “standing” competitive market of ten or more sup-
pliers. Others in the working group, however, were unhappy with the
proposed approach, which would have limited electronic reverse auc-
tions to those markets with ten or more participants. The UNCITRAL
working group ultimately concluded, therefore, that there should be no
fixed minimum number of bidders, but that instead there should simply
be a sufficient number of bidders to ensure effective competition.52 At
the same time, though, the working group rejected imposing any arti-
ficial upper limits on the number of bidders in a reverse auction, in part
because of the relatively low marginal costs of including additional bid-
ders in an electronic auction. The working group’s debate, which high-
lighted the need for a competitive market analysis before embarking on
a reverse auction, highlights a gap in current U.S. practice.53
50. See H.R. Rep. No. 109-360, supra note 43, at 770 (“For example, items that call for tech-
nical solutions, require modification, or will be acquired on a basis other than low-cost are un-
likely to be suited to acquisition through reverse auction methods.”).
51. See Thomas F. Burke, Online Reverse Auctions, 00-11 Briefing Papers 1 (Oct. 2000) (dis-
cussing risk of collusion in electronic auctions). For a more detailed discussion of below-cost
pricing, see infra notes 69–97 and accompanying text.
52. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 75.
53. A recent reverse auction sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Standards & Tech-
nology (NIST), for example, called for a reverse auction of a device with the following specifi-
cations, in a procurement specially set aside for small business, per Solicitation No. SB1341-06-
Q-0223:
LI 001, High Resolution Quartz Crystal Microbalance (QCM) Instrument Background:NIST
Polymers Division is assembling a new quartz crystal microbalance instrument suitable for AT-
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• Prequalification of bidders: The UNCITRAL Secretariat also proposed
new text for the UNCITRALmodel law, to govern purchasing agencies’
conduct in the pre-auction period.54 The first issue raised by the pro-
posed language went to prequalification.Under the Secretariat’s proposed
language, procuring entities would be left the option of not reviewing
prospective tenderers in prequalification procedures, per the Brazilian
model, which may defer a review of supplier qualifications until after a
reverse auction.55 In the Brazilian system, however, reverse auctions are
generally used only for certain limited categories of commodities.56
Should the United States not similarly limit the universe of items subject
to reverse auction, procuring agencies may wish to “screen” prospective
vendors through prequalification proceedings.
• “Models” for structuring reverse auctions: Much more controversial at the
UNCITRAL meeting, however, were the different “models” of elec-
tronic reverse auctions that the Secretariat’s working paper put forward.
Those models, developed by Professor Sue Arrowsmith57 and drawn
from international practice, had been outlined in an earlier working
paper:
33. Depending on which evaluation criteria are assessed and when, three
models conducting ERAs [electronic reverse auctions] are used in practice
by procuring entities:
cut quartz crystal analysis by phase-lock oscillation with high speed data readout. The appli-
cation area is the direct measure of change in quartz substrate frequency versus time for the
analysis of photoresist thin films dissolution. The suitable QCM shall meet the following
specifications: 1. Quartz crystal substrates and cells 1.1. 5 MHz resonance frequency AT-cut
QCM substrates with 1 inch diameter coated with 300 nm of chromium optimized for 25
degrees C measurements (50 required) 1.2. 5 MHz resonance frequency AT-cut QCM sub-
strates with 1 inch diameter coated with 300 nm of gold optimized for 25 degrees C measure-
ments (50 required) 1.3. Temperature control 1.4. QCM flow cell made of organic solvent
resistant material. Preferably Teflon housing withVitonO-rings. 2. Microbalance 2.1. Mass
sensitivity range using 5 MHz crystals 2.2. Ability to measure resistance and frequency
change 2.3. Capability to measure at least two simultaneous running QCM experiments for
cross-correlation of changes in frequency from sample to reference, thereby eliminating noise,
confirming true frequency changes from artifact. 2.4. Frequency resolution 0.1 Hz
2.5. High speed data acquisition ms resolution 3. Data acquisition and software 3.1. I/O
card for TTL data acquisition trigger externally controlled by software 3.2. Software for
QCM data analysis and reduction 3.3. Libraries for LabView operation, 1, EA;
http://www.fbo.gov/spg/DOC/NTIS/NTIS/SB1341%2D06%2DQ%2D0223/Combine%20
Synopsis%5FSolicitation.html. There was no indication in this solicitation (or in many other
reverse auctions’ solicitations reviewed on http://www.fedbizopps.gov) that the purchasingagency
had ensured that there was, in fact, a robust competitive market for the listed item, which in turn
raised the risk that the reverse auction could result in higher prices than might normally be the
case.
54. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40, supra note 38, ¶ 20.
55. Id., ¶ 22. For a further study of the Brazilian reverse auction system, see Luiz Antonio Joia
& Fuad Zamot, Internet-Based Reverse Auctions by the Brazilian Government, 9:6 Elec. J. Info. Sys.
Devel. Countries (2002), available at http://www.is.cityu.edu.hk/research/ejisdc/vol9/v9r6.pdf.
56. See, e.g., Yukins & Wallace, supra note 37, at n.56.
57. See Arrowsmith, supra note 36, at 307 (developing models); Sue Arrowsmith, Electronic
Reverse Auctions Under the New EC Procurement Directives, 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 203
(2005) (applying models).
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Model 1, in which all aspects of tenders that are to be compared in selecting
the winning supplier are submitted through the ERA itself. Often lowest
price is the sole award criterion in competitions conducted entirely through
an ERA. Tenderers know their position both during the ERA phase and its
close;
Model 2, with prior assessment of all tender aspects or only those not subject
to the ERA phase. Before the ERA phase, suppliers are provided with infor-
mation on their ranking based on the outcome of an evaluation of the rele-
vant tenderer prior to the ERA. All evaluation criteria are factored in a math-
ematical formula, which re-ranks the tenderers on the submission of each
bid. Thus, during the ERA phase and at its close, suppliers know their overall
standing;
Model 3, in which there is no prior assessment of any aspects of the tender.
During the ERA phase, suppliers have information only on how they com-
pare with their competitors in respect of those criteria that are subject to the
ERA phase (usually, but not always, just the price). Thus, in contrast with
models 1 and 2, when the ERA phase closes, the suppliers do not knowwhose
tender is the best; this is established once the “non-auction” aspects of the
tender have been factored in.58
Discussion at the Working Group reflected a consensus that
“Model 3”—in which, for example, bidders will compete on price in a
reverse auction but award will be made based upon criteria applied after
the reverse auction—is sharply disfavored, for bidders under Model 3
are bidding “blindly” in the initial auction, without knowing how their
bids may affect their ultimate chances of award. Model 3 was therefore
not under serious consideration by the Working Group.
Ironically, however, Model 3 appears still to be used by U.S. agencies,
which continue to launch reverse auctions without any regulatory guid-
ance. One recent U.S. agency solicitation (which followed a common
pattern in such solicitations) clearly stated, for example, that the pur-
chasing agency might well apply nonprice evaluation criteria only after
the results of the price auction had been delivered:
This is a combined synopsis/solicitation for commercial items prepared in
accordance with the format in FAR Subpart 12.6, in conjunction with FAR
13.5, and as supplemented with additional information included in this no-
tice. This announcement constitutes the only solicitation . . .
The GSA [General Services Administration] FTS [Federal Technology Ser-
vice] Region 6 requires the following items, EXACT MATCH ONLY, to
the following:
LI 001, P2-P7U-L2L, ATL P4000/P7000 HP LTO-2 200GB, LVD SCSI,
hot-swap tape drive, field upgrade, Brand Name Quantum, 8, EA; . . .
For this solicitation, GSA FTS Region 6 intends to conduct an online com-
petitive reverse auction to be facilitated by the third-party reverse auction
provider, . . . [The third-party reverse auction provider] has developed an
online, anonymous, browser based application to conduct the reverse auc-
58. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.35, supra note 37, ¶ 33.
Assessing UNCITRAL’s Lessons for U.S. Procurement 471
tion. An Offeror may submit a series of pricing quotes, which descend in
price during the specified period of time for the aforementioned reverse
auction. GSA FTS Region 6 is taking this action in an effort to improve
vendor access and awareness of requests while expediting its ability to gather
multiple, completed, real-time offers. All responsible Offerors that respond
to this solicitation MUST submit the pricing portion of their offer using the
online exchange . . . Offerors may not artificially manipulate the price of a
transaction . . . by any means. . .
Buyers and Sellers agree to conduct this transaction through [the third-party
auction service] in compliance with the . . . Terms of Use. Buyers and Sellers
understand that [the third-party auction service provider] ranks all bids by price,
regardless of the evaluation criteria used by the Buyer; however, pursuant to appli-
cable acquisition regulations and/or departmental guidelines, Buyers may use criteria
other than price to evaluate the offer. Please note that any such evaluation criteria
must be articulated in the solicitation to the extent required by such regu-
lations and/or guidelines. . .59
59. http://www.fbo.gov/spg/GSA/FTS/6TS-A-SMTP/DKTS06NS000H/Combine%20
Synopsis%5FSolicitation.html (emphasis added).
Another recent solicitation, this one from the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, took the same
approach, signaling to vendors that their technical proposals would be considered separately
from—and presumably after—the price auction, in a format replicated acrossmany reverse auction
solicitations posted at www.fedbizopps.gov:
The US Patent & Trademark Office requires the following items, BRAND NAME OR
EQUAL, to the following: LI [Line Item] 001, Oxford green pressboard folders, item
#H1502F13. Pressboard end tab expansion file folder. Extra-durable, 25 pt.2” expansion green
pressboard. Tyvek gussets. Each box must be marked with PTO-2154 IFWRetention Folders.,
100000, EA;
. . . All responsible Offerors that respond to this solicitation MUST submit the pricing portion
of their offer using the online exchange located at [third-party auction services vendor’s
website] . . .
In addition to providing pricing at [the online reverse auction site] for this solicitation, each
Offeror must provide any required, NON-PRICING responses (e.g. technical proposal, rep-
resentations and certifications, etc.) directly to shirlena.morgan@uspto.gov (NOTTHROUGH
[THE REVERSE AUCTION SERVICES VENDOR]) so that they are received at that email
address no later than the closing date and time for this solicitation. . . Buyers and Sellers
understand that [the reverse auction third-party vendor] ranks all bids by price, regardless of
the evaluation criteria used by the Buyer; however, pursuant to applicable acquisition regula-
tions and/or departmental guidelines, Buyers may use criteria other than price to evaluate the
offer. Please note that any such evaluation criteria must be articulated in the solicitation to the
extent required by such regulations and/or guidelines. Award will be made based on Best Value
to the government. . .
http://www.fbo.gov/spg/DOC/PTO/OPDC20220/150D0600305/Combine%20Synopsis%5F
Solicitation.html.
A third solicitation, again posted on http://www.fedbizopps.gov, but offering support from a
different third-party reverse auction vendor, also indicated that the purchasing agency (UNICOR)
would weigh nonprice factors after the reverse auction was over—which again meant, in essence,
that the vendors in the reverse auctions would be bidding “blindly,” without knowing how the
agency would weigh price and quality:
During the auction, Offerors will provide pricing through submission of electronic offers
via the [third-party vendor] website. The primary pricing competition for this solicitation will
be through the online reverse auction. [The third-party reverse auction vendor] will explain
this process in detail and train each qualified offeror prior to the reverse auction through a
simulated reverse auction. Qualified Offerors will have the ability to submit revised pricing
during the auction in response to prices submitted by other offerors. The identity of offerors
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The solicitation for this reverse auction, written in a regulatory void,
thus described a reverse auction in which the buying agency could eval-
uate nonprice factors after the price auction was concluded—but, con-
trary to basic principles of public procurement, the bidders in the reverse
auction would have no idea what relative weight price and nonprice
factors would have in the evaluation. The lesson from the UNCITRAL
working group, therefore, is that U.S. regulators should, at the very least,
make it clear that U.S. agencies should not engage in “Model 3” reverse
auctions.
• Regulating “Model 1” and “Model 2” auctions: Because the UNCITRAL
working group largely rejectedModel 3 out of hand,Model 1 (all criteria
for award included in auction) and Model 2 (preranking reflected in
“handicapped” bidding) thus were the only models under serious con-
sideration.60 Several members of the working group argued that it is not
clear that Model 2 (ranking and handicapping bidders before the price
auction) is a sound approach. Opponents of Model 2 noted that it is an
approach typically favored by proponents of reverse auctions, whowould
like to argue that all criteria for award can ultimately be “factored into”
a reverse auction. Model 2 raises transparency and competition con-
cerns, however, for it is not clear whether vendors will fully understand
how the pre-auction “ranking” will impact their bids in the reverse auc-
tion, i.e., how their bids will be “handicapped.”61 Several members of
the Working Group—including, especially, those from member states
of the European Union, which allows Model 262—nevertheless argued
in favor of including Model 2 in the UNCITRAL Model Law.63 As
will not be revealed to each other during the auction. The final such revision during the auction
will be considered the Offerors’ final proposal. The Contracting Officer reserves the right to
conduct verbal or written discussions with respect to factors other than price with the Offerors
at anytime prior to award. Only offerors that have been determined qualified will be permitted
to participate in the auction. Offerors who are deemed qualified will be notified by the Con-
tracting Officer.
http://fs1.fbo.gov/EPSData/DOJ/Synopses/4786/CT1758-06/CT1758.PDF. This example shows,
again, that U.S. agencies at least appear to be conducting “Model 3” auctions, despite a strong
international consensus against these sorts of auctions in which the price competition precedes the
agency’s consideration of the vendors’ technical worth.
60. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶¶ 84–85.
61. Model 2 also raises logical concerns: for example, an attribute that leads to a high ranking
before the bidding begins (a particularly robust transmission in an automobile, for example) should,
in theory, hurt the bidder as prices descend in the reverse auction, for that robust attribute increases
performance risk (raises the risk of default) as the reverse auction “ratchets down” the prices
offered. Thus, a prebid “ranking” under Model 2 seems to offer a good deal of opportunity for
missteps, and (several argued) Model 1 is the safer, simpler course. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/
590, supra note 4, ¶ 85.
62. See, e.g., European Union Directive 2004/18/EC, 49, art. 54.
63. The working group did not address the technical challenges that Model 2 can raise: if
offers are “ranked” before the electronic reverse auction begins, Model 2 assumes that ranking
will “handicap” the price-based bids in the electronic auction (i.e., higher-ranked bids will not
have to offer the same price concessions). This “handicapping” system logically requires, however,
a relatively sophisticated electronic auction, for bidders need to know where they stand in the
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noted, U.S. regulators have not distinguished between the various “mod-
els” for electronic reverse auctions, and until they do, it will be impos-
sible to determine which, if any, approaches should be allowed in U.S.
procurement.
• Elements of solicitation: TheUNCITRAL Secretariat’s proposed language
for the Model Law would spell out the required elements of a solicita-
tion. For comparison purposes, Table 1 compares those proposed ele-
ments with the elements taken from Article 54 of European Union Di-
rective 2004/18/EC.64
For U.S. regulators, the proposed UNCITRAL language obviously
offers much more detail to prospective bidders on how the reverse auc-
tion will be conducted. The required elements outlined in the proposed
UNCITRAL approach are not onerous, and they offer a useful checklist,
should U.S. regulation proceed in this area.
• Ranking information broadcast to bidders: The European directive, which
contemplates prebid “ranking” and “handicapping,” requires that bid-
ders be told of their relative rankings throughout the auction. This raises
risks of gamesmanship throughout the auction, and raises risks of price
signaling as bidders can recognize how the market is organizing itself.65
From the procuring entity’s standpoint, another (and perhaps less risky)
alternative is to post only the “best” bid, which was one of the solutions
suggested at the recent UNCITRAL working group meeting. In U.S.
reverse auctions, one firm that provides substantial reverse-auction ser-
vices to federal agencies uses a “lead/lag”method, which tells each bidder
only whether its is the “lead” bid or “lags” behind that lead.66 In prin-
ciple, this should reduce firms’ ability to reinforce an incipient cartel
through the reverse auction.67
• Failure of “winning” bidder: The UNCITRAL Secretariat also addressed
the situation where the winning bidder “collapses” after the auction is
over. Instead of simply awarding to the next-best bid, the UNCITRAL
Secretariat proposed to the working group that the bidding should be
reopened, or another form of procurement should be considered, if the
auction, even accounting for their handicaps. On this point alone—technical complexity—it
seems, again, that Model 2 raises potential obstacles to implementation.
64. The UNCITRAL secretariat also proposed language for the model law, outlining how
electronic reverse auctions should be conducted. SeeU.N.Doc.No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40, supra
note 38, ¶¶ 26–27.
65. See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Staff Report, Entering the 21st Century: Competi-
tion Policy in the World of B2B Electronic Marketplaces 10–11 (2000), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breprot.pdf.
66. See FedBid, Terms of Use, http://docs.fedbid.com/fedbid/termsview.html#bidprocess(last
visited Mar. 14, 2006).
67. See generally Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law:
Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 Anti-
trust L.J. 83 (2004) (discussing collusive behavior in auctions); Susan L. Turley, Wielding the
Virtual Gavel—DOD Moves Forward with Reverse Auctions, 173Mil. L. Rev. 1 (2002) (discussing
literature on potential anticompetitive collusion in government reverse auctions).
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TABLE 1:
Comparison of European Union Directive and UNCITRAL Proposed
Language on Specifications for Reverse Auction
European Directive Proposed UNCITRAL Model Law
The specifications shall
include, inter alia, the fol-
lowing details:
(a) the features, the values
for which will be the sub-
ject of electronic auction,
provided that such fea-
tures are quantifiable and
can be expressed in fig-
ures or percentages;
(b) any limits on the val-
ues which may be submit-
ted, as they result from
the specifications relating
to the subject of the
contract;
(c) the information which
will be made available to
tenderers in the course of
the electronic auction
and, where appropriate,
when it will be made
available to them;
(d) the relevant informa-
tion concerning the elec-
tronic auction process;
(e) the conditions under
which the tenderers will
be able to bid and, in par-
ticular, the minimum dif-
ferences which will, where
appropriate, be required
when bidding;
(f ) the relevant informa-
tion concerning the elec-
tronic equipment used
and the arrangements and
technical specifications for
connection.
(4) (e) Unless already provided to suppliers or contractors, the
invitation to participate in the electronic reverse auction shall in-
clude [the following information] . . . :
(i) If features of tenders other than price have been used in the
initial evaluation, the results of the initial evaluation of the invi-
tee’s own tender;
[(ii) The date and time of the opening of the electronic reverse
auction;
(iii) The website address at which the electronic reverse auction
will be held, and at which the auction rules, the tender and other
relevant documents will be accessible;
(iv) The requirements for registration and identification of bid-
ders at the opening of the auction;
(v) The features of the tender that are to be presented at the
auction;
(vi) If the award is to be based on the lowest evaluated tender,
the formula to be used to quantify the non-price features to be
presented [any such feature is to be quantifiable and capable of
expression as a figure or percentage]. The formula shall incorpo-
rate the weighting of all the criteria established to determine the
lowest evaluated tender;
(vii) The information that will be made available to bidders in
the course of the auction and, where appropriate, how and when
it will be made available;
(viii) All relevant information concerning the auction process it-
self, including any identification data for the procurement, tech-
nical requirements as to information technology equipment to be
utilized, whether there will be only a single stage of the auction,
or multiple stages (in which case, the number of stages and the
duration of each stage);
(ix) The conditions under which the bidders will be able to bid
and, in particular, any minimum differences in price or other fea-
tures that will [be required when bidding] [must be improved in
any individual new submission during the auction] [and the time
which the procuring entity will allow to elapse after receiving the
last submission before closing the auction];
(x) All relevant information concerning the electronic equipment
used and the arrangements and technical specifications for
connection;
(xi) The criteria that shall determine the closure of the auction;]
and
(xii) All [other] information necessary to enable the supplier or
contractor to participate in the auction. [The procurement regu-
lations may prescribe the information that is to be so provided.]
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procuring agency finds that the winning bidder cannot perform. The
Secretariat’s approach was supported by several observers, for the Sec-
retariat’s approach, which would not simply default to the second-best
bidder, would make it less likely that “straw” leading bidders could be
used by “second-best” bidders to manipulate auctions (for the “second-
best” bidders could otherwise reserve significant pricing margins, know-
ing that the “winning” bidder would ultimately collapse).68
The UNCITRAL working group’s discussion of electronic reverse auc-
tions thus yielded important lessons for U.S. regulators. The international
discussion suggests that U.S. reverse auctions should be regulated—practical
experience from around the world suggests that leaving reverse auctions un-
regulated leaves far too much risk—and the ongoing international dialogue
suggests how that regulation could be structured. Should U.S. policymakers
move to regulate reverse auctions (which seems the sensible course at this
point), the regulatory path forward is already well-marked by experience from
around the world.
IV. ABNORMALLY LOW TENDERS
The final substantive issue taken up by the November 2005 Working
Group meeting was the lingering issue of below-cost (“abnormally low”) bid-
ding.69 In the U.S. procurement system, abnormally low pricing is generally
referred to as pricing that is too low to be “realistic.” In the wake of bidding,
but before award, the contracting officer may be called upon to determine
whether the price offered is indeed “realistic.” In principle,70 “low-ball” (or
below-cost) pricing could occur for a number of reasons,71 including:
• Predatory pricing, to drive out competitors.
• At-loss pricing to maintain market share.
• Indifference to cost constraints because of, e.g., imminent bankruptcy.
• Mistakes as to true internal costs of production.
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted in Star Mountain, Inc.,72
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) “provides a number of price analysis
68. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 92.
69. These issues were addressed in a working paper, UNCITRAL, Possible Revisions to the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services—Drafting Materials for
the Use of Electronic Reverse Auctions in Public Procurement, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40/
Add. 1 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_
groups/1Procurement.html.
70. For an excellent theoretical assessment of auction pricing theory in the context of reverse
auctions in public procurement, see Ohad Soudry, Promoting Economy: Electronic Reverse Auctions
Under the EC Directives on Public Procurement, 4 J. Pub. Procurement 340 (2004).
71. As Professors Ralph Nash and John Cibinic stressed, however, low pricing intended to
drive a new contractor into a market or project—“buy-in” pricing—is not necessarily a malicious
business practice. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Buying-In: An Improper Business Practice? 18
Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 14 (Apr. 2004).
72. Comp. Gen. B-285883, Oct. 25, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 189.
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techniques that may be used [by agencies] to determine whether prices are
reasonable [not too high] and realistic [not too low], including comparison of
the prices received with each other; comparison of previously proposed prices
for the same or similar items; comparison with independent government es-
timates; and analysis of pricing information provided by the offeror.”73 Be-
cause U.S. agencies are often barred from demanding cost information from
vendors,74 agencies typically cannot determine directly whether the vendor’s
pricing is below cost (something that is not transparent to the agency).75
Because contractors bear the risk that they will be able to complete the
work at the price paid on a firm-fixed-price project, agencies logically focus
instead on whether a low price poses performance risk. The Government’s
position is that if the contractor has bid below cost, that is the contractor’s
73. Id. (citing FAR 15.404-1(b)(2)).
74. See, e.g., FAR 15.403-1. The bar against demanding cost data does not mean, however,
that agencies cannot perform effective price-realism analyses, by using negotiating strategies such
as that outlined by Professors Nash and Cibinic, in a strategy suggested for negotiating a services
contract:
To enable the agency to conduct such negotiation, the [solicitation] has to call for the sub-
mission of sufficient data to permit analysis of the price. FAR 15.403-1(b)(1) prohibits requiring
the submission of cost or pricing data when the [contracting officer] determines that prices
agreed upon are based on adequate price competition but this should not keep the agency from
obtaining sufficient data to do a good price analysis. In most cases, the most important data is
labor hours of effort to accomplish the major tasks called for by the contract. The competitors
should be required to submit the labor hours, by labor category, for their own workers and
their major subcontractors that will perform the task. Analysis and comparison of these labor
hours should identify disparities where an offeror has proposed to do the work for significantly
more or fewer hours than other offerors or the Government estimate. This is the subject of a
good price negotiation that will reveal cases where the offeror does not have the same under-
standing of the work as the Government or where the offeror is “buying in” to win the award.
Offerors should, of course, be given the opportunity to submit a final proposal revision to
adjust their price as a result of such negotiation. See FAR 15.307(b). To deal with the possibility
that the offeror may stick with a “buy in” price, the [solicitation] should contain a provision
calling for a price realism analysis to determine the risk of such a low price. . . . This does not
mean refusing to award the contract to an offer with an unrealistically low price but evaluating
the risk of such an award in terms of its effect on successful performance of the contract.
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Price Negotiation: The Lost Art? 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 62
(Dec. 2003); see also Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Price-Based Acquisition: “Just Do It!” 14Nash
& Cibinic Rep. ¶ 17 (Mar. 2000) (noting that effective price negotiation to mitigate performance
risk requires skill and sophistication); Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Price Realism Analysis: A
Tricky Issue, 12 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 40 ( July 1998) (step-by-step strategy for bringing price
realism analysis to bear in procurement).
75. Perhaps because of the natural contradictions and tensions here—agencies must try to
assess contractors’ prices to gauge whether they are below cost, usually without direct access to
data on contractors’ actual costs—the regulatory scheme is, perhaps predictably, somewhat
murky. See, e.g., Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Price Realism in Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts: A
Tricky Evaluation, 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 51 (Oct. 2003) (“FAR 15.404-1(d) [which provides
guidance in this area] is a sorry excuse for a regulation when it comes to price realism analysis
and we hope this decision will induce Contracting Officers to ignore it and do the job right. Of
course, the [Federal Acquisition Regulation] Council should also rewrite the regulation but we
are not holding our breath.”); Jerome S. Gabig, FAR Part 15 Rewrite—A Lost Opportunity to Reduce
the Confusion Involving Cost Realism, 12 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 16 (Mar. 1998) (noting that FAR
does not deal clearly with issues of price realism).
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risk,76 though the Government recognizes that there is a lingering risk that
the contractor, having bid too low and so without adequate resources, will
abandon or short-change performance. In resolving questions of “low-ball”
bids, therefore, agencies have focused on whether the bid in effect poses per-
formance risk; in doing so, as noted, agencies have focused primarily on
whether the bidder seemed to understand the requirements of the contract.
See, for example, Mindleaf Technologies, Inc.,77 where the Government Ac-
countability Office held:
Mindleaf [the protester] also contends that because [the awardee] KMR’s price
proposal is unrealistically low, it reflects KMR’s lack of understanding of the solic-
itation, which, in turn, represents a significant performance risk to the government.
The Air Force responds that it determined that performance risk was low by virtue
of KMR’s understanding of the solicitation’s requirements as reflected in KMR’s
proposal. Specifically, in addition to responding to each of the evaluation criteria,
KMR’s proposal identified an approach for realizing efficiency in staff training.
Furthermore, KMR’s experience as incumbent gave credence to KMR’s under-
standing of the solicitation. We find no basis to disagree with the Air Force’s con-
clusion. In any event, as discussed above, we find reasonable the Air Force’s deter-
mination that KMR’s price is not unrealistically low.78
In the U.S. system, therefore, agencies typically will assess price realism
by asking whether “‘the proposed cost or price provides an adequate reflection
of [the contractor’s] understanding of the requirements of the solicitation.’”79
As the GAO explained in J.A. Farrington Janitorial Services,80 this question of
price realism often becomes part of the purchasing agency’s broader assess-
ment of the offeror’s “responsibility,” or ability to perform:81
76. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics-Ordnance & Tactical Sys., Comp. Gen. B-295987, B-295987.2,
May 20, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 114 (“Generally, where, as here, a solicitation contemplates the award
of a fixed-price contract, the agency is not required to conduct a realism analysis. This is because
a fixed-price (as opposed to a cost-type) contract places the risk and responsibility for loss on the
contractor.”).
77. Comp. Gen. B-294242, B-294242.2, Aug. 24, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 157.
78. Id.
79. E.g., E. Huttenbauer & Son, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-257778, B-257779, Nov. 8, 1994, 94-2
CPD ¶ 206.
80. Comp. Gen. B-296875, Oct. 18, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 187.
81. See, e.g., CSE Constr., Comp. Gen. B-291268.2, Dec. 16, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 207 (“Where
there is no relevant evaluation criterion pertaining to realism or understanding [in the solicita-
tion], a determination that an offeror’s price on a fixed-price contract is too low generally con-
cerns the offeror’s responsibility, i.e., the offeror’s ability and capacity to successfully perform
the contract at its offered price.”). As noted, the FAR recommends the following methods for
assessing prices; although the FAR states that these are methods for assessing price reasonableness
(for ensuring that the price is not too high), the methods are also recommended for assessing
price realism (in an effort to gauge whether the price offered poses a performance risk to the
government):
(b) Price analysis.
(1) Price analysis is the process of examining and evaluating a proposed price without eval-
uating its separate cost elements and proposed profit.
(2) The Government may use various price analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a
fair and reasonable price. Examples of such techniques include, but are not limited to, the
following:
478 Public Contract Law Journal • Vol. 35, No. 3 • Spring 2006
Before awarding a fixed-priced contract, an agency is required to determine that
the price offered is fair and reasonable. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
§ 15.402(a). An agency’s concern in making a price reasonableness determination
focuses primarily on whether the offered prices are higher than warranted, and the
results of the analysis may be used in negotiating reasonable prices. . . Although
agencies are required to perform some sort of price or cost analysis on negotiated
contracts to ensure that proposed prices are fair and reasonable, where, as here, the
award of a fixed-price contract is contemplated, a proposal’s price realism is not
ordinarily considered, since a fixed-price contract places the risk and responsibility
for contract costs and resulting profit or loss on the contractor. An agency may, but
is not required to, provide in the solicitation for a price realism analysis for such purposes
as measuring an offeror’s understanding of the solicitation requirements, or to avoid the
risk of poor performance from a contractor who is forced to provide goods or services
at little or no profit. . . However, where there is no relevant evaluation criterion per-
taining to realism or understanding, a determination that an offeror’s price on a fixed-
price contract is too low generally concerns the offeror’s responsibility, i.e., the offeror’s
ability and capacity to successfully perform the contract at its offered price.82
The approach taken in the U.S. procurement system—where the legal
presumptions tip away from probing unrealistically low offers on fixed-price
contracts—contrasts with the UNCITRAL reform effort, which would take a
more cautious approach to unrealistically low bidding.When theUNCITRAL
working group convened in November 2005, the working group members
had before them the UNCITRAL Secretariat’s working paper, which sug-
gested amendments to the Model Procurement Law to address abnormally
(i) Comparison of proposed prices received in response to the solicitation. Normally,
adequate price competition establishes price reasonableness (see 15.403-1(c)(1)).
(ii) Comparison of previously proposed prices and previous Government and commercial
contract prices with current proposed prices for the same or similar items, if both the validity
of the comparison and the reasonableness of the previous price(s) can be established.
(iii) Use of parametric estimating methods/application of rough yardsticks (such as dollars
per pound or per horsepower, or other units) to highlight significant inconsistencies that
warrant additional pricing inquiry.
(iv) Comparison with competitive published price lists, published market prices of com-
modities, similar indexes, and discount or rebate arrangements.
(v) Comparison of proposed prices with independent Government cost estimates.
(vi) Comparison of proposed prices with prices obtained through market research for the
same or similar items.
(vii) Analysis of pricing information provided by the offeror.
FAR 15.404-1(b).
82. Id. (emphasis added). Professors Ralph Nash and John Cibinic summarized the U.S. case
law in this area as follows:
[W]e can paraphrase it more clearly by stating that a price realism analysis indicating that an
offeror’s price is very low can be used in three ways:
(1) To assess an offeror’s understanding of the work.
(2) To assess the degree of performance risk posed by the low price.
(3) To determine whether the offeror is a responsible contractor.
What needs to be said in the [Federal Acquisition Regulation]—but isn’t—is that the first two
uses of a price realism analysis can only be made if there is an evaluation factor in the request
for proposals calling for this type of assessment.
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Price Realism: It’s Different from Price Reasonableness, 17 Nash &
Cibinic Rep. ¶ 14 (Mar. 2003).
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low bids.83 In a nutshell, the proposed changes to the model law would have
allowed a contracting official to probe any offer that seemed unrealistically
low and, if the contracting officer remained unsatisfied that the contract could
be performed at the offered price, to reject the offer. The working group took
up the proposed changes, and noted the following policy concerns:
• Possible discrimination: The proposed changes would vest contracting of-
ficials with substantial discretion to exclude bids that seemed unrealis-
tically low. These provisions could be used in a discriminatory manner,
to exclude, for example, new entrants to a procurement market that
consistently offer lower prices.84 Because of this potentially discrimina-
tory impact, the UNCITRAL working group members noted that it is
important to stress that the “price realism” review process must be trans-
parent and meant to enhance, not reduce, competition.
• Price-based assessment: The members of the working group stressed that
any assessment of an offeror’s price should not rely on cost information,
i.e., when assessing prices that seem low, contracting officials should not
demand or rely upon contractors’ cost data. This is an important dis-
tinction to draw, because the European directives,85 which allow con-
tracting officials to demand information on the “constituent elements”
of a suspect bid, veer disturbingly towards a cost-based assessment of price
83. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.40/Add. 1, supra note 69, ¶¶ 27–29.
84. SeeU.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 107. For a criticism of a U.S. procurement
in which the agency assessed price realism only by comparing the offeror’s prices to previous
contractors’ prices—and, probably unsurprisingly, found “risk” in the offeror’s lower prices—see
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postcript II: Price Realism Analysis, 19 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 37
( July 2005) (reviewing Systems, Studies & Simulation, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-295579, Mar. 28,
2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 78). Professor Nash termed this narrow analysis simply “weird.”
85. Article 57 of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31
March 2004 Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water,
Energy, Transport and Postal Services Sectors, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 1, provides as follows:
Abnormally low tenders
1. If, for a given contract, tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the goods,
works or services, the contracting entity shall, before it may reject those tenders, request in
writing details of the constituent elements of the tender which it considers relevant.
Those details may relate in particular to:
(a) the economics of the manufacturing process, of the services provided and of the con-
struction method;
(b) the technical solutions chosen and/or any exceptionally favourable conditions available
to the tenderer for the supply of the goods or services or for the execution of the work;
(c) the originality of the supplies, services or work proposed by the tenderer;
(d) compliance with the provisions relating to employment protection and working con-
ditions in force at the place where the work, service or supply is to be performed;
(e) the possibility of the tenderer obtaining State aid.
2. The contracting entity shall verify those constituent elements by consulting the tenderer,
taking account of the evidence supplied.
3. Where a contracting entity establishes that a tender is abnormally low because the ten-
derer has obtained State aid, the tender can be rejected on that ground alone only after con-
sultation with the tenderer where the latter is unable to prove, within a sufficient time limit
fixed by the contracting entity, that the aid in question was granted legally. Where the con-
tracting entity rejects a tender in these circumstances, it shall inform the Commission of that
fact.
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realism. The experience in the United States shows that a system for
reviewing vendors’ costs (as opposed to prices) is extremely cumbersome
and difficult. It means, ultimately, erecting a system of rules and audits
for determining which costs are allowable. Several observers stressed,
therefore, that it is important that the Model Procurement Law remain
rooted in price analysis.
Despite these concerns, the members of the working group did concur that
contracting officials should be given the authority—and should be encour-
aged—to probe bids that seem suspiciously low.86 The challenge is to ensure
that the price realism review not be used to discriminate, for example, against
new market entrants that hope to penetrate a market precisely because their
prices are so low.
These concerns, as they play out in the UNCITRAL and European rules,
shed light on the U.S. rules regarding price realism—and the U.S. rules,
correspondingly, suggest a way forward for other nations. As was noted above,
those crafting U.S. procurement law generally have taken a dim view of bid
protests challenging price realism, and have held that typically price realism
will not be independently assessed unless the solicitation previously alerted bid-
ders that price realism would be a point of review.87 Notably, the UNCITRAL
working group favored the same approach: to ensure transparency and non-
discrimination, contracting agencies should have to notify bidders in the so-
licitation that prices will be assessed for realism.88 This would give bidders at
least some opportunity to raise objections, if it appeared that the price realism
review would really be used only to exclude bidders unfairly, on discriminatory
grounds.
The UNCITRAL debate also suggested, though, that the U.S. approach
to price realism may need to be liberalized.89 The U.S. approach to price
86. See U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 109.
87. See, e.g., AllWorld Language Consultants, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-291409, B-291509.2, Dec.
16, 2002, 2003 CPD ¶ 13 (no price realism analysis required where none was provided for in
solicitation). As the U.S. Court of Federal Claims explained in Labat-Anderson Inc. v. United
States, 50 Fed. Cl. 99 (2001), the “realism of offerors’ proposed prices is not ordinarily considered
in the context of a fixed-price [agreement] because the contractor bears the risk of unreasonable
cost estimates under such a vehicle.” The court in Labat-Anderson cited, however, FAR 15.404-
1(d)(3), which permits cost realism analyses, to probe underlying costs, in exceptional cases for
fixed-price-type contracts, and Hydraulics Int’l Inc., Comp. Gen. B-284684, B-284684.2, May
24, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 149, which noted that the nature and extent of an agency’s price realism
analysis are matters within the agency’s discretion. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), it should be noted, routinely provides in its form solicitations that price realism will be
evaluated. See EPA Acquisition Regulation 1515.209, 1552.215-70 (“[T]he Government will also
evaluate proposals to determine contract cost or price realism.”). In essence, in accordance with
the framework erected by the GAO decisions, the EPA has opened the door to a price realism
analysis in any of the negotiated procurements covered by these standard terms. Cf. Ralph C.
Nash & John Cibinic, Price Reasonableness: A Much Misunderstood Term, 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep.
¶ 22 (Apr. 2003) (arguing that a prudent contracting official should always make price realism
part of a solicitation’s stated basis for evaluation, so that the door is always open to price realism
analysis, to protect the government’s interest).
88. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.9/590, supra note 4, ¶ 108.
89. Notably, Professors Cibinic and Nash long argued, in their writing and in their teaching,
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realism, as developed in the GAO and court decisions, focuses first—and
almost exclusively—upon the allocation of legal risk in a fixed-price contract.90
As the U.S. bid challenge forums have emphasized, a fixed-price bidder bears
the legal risk that its bid will prove unrealistically low. As a result, the GAO91
and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims have been reluctant to open the door
to protests alleging unrealistically low bids, although they will consider a bid
protest challenging a price realism analysis if the solicitation signaled that the
reviewing agency would assess price realism, say, for example, to assess the
offeror’s understanding of the solicitation’s technical requirements.92
What the U.S. decisions do not fully address, however, is the practical risk
of failed performance, when the winning contractor’s bid was below cost and
performance is not secured by some sort of bond. Indeed, in U.S. procure-
ment, outside the construction realm (where performance bonds are the
norm),93 very few contracts require security to ensure that performance is
completed. Arguably, this leaves a significant risk that performance will fail.
In U.S. procurement, the risk of that failure is mitigated by a series of checks
on improvident contractors, including sophisticated systems that allow gov-
ernment officials to assess prospective contractors’ ability to perform, a ma-
ture bankruptcy system that allows contractors to perform even if financially
crippled, and the onerous long-term injuries (to reputation and otherwise)
that contractors know they will suffer if they default on a federal contract.
Those risk-mitigation measures are not perfect, however, and where a con-
tractor’s prices may, in fact, be unrealistically below cost, the Government
that the Federal Acquisition Regulation should be amended so that price realism would be as-
sessed in every fixed-price procurement. E.g., Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, The Federal Acqui-
sition Regulation: Can It Be Made a Quality Document? 16 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 22 (May 2002);
Ralph C. Nash & John C. Cibinic, Contract Prices: What Is a “Fair and Reasonable Price”? 15Nash
& Cibinic Rep. ¶ 22 (Apr. 2001); Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, An Excellent Procurement, 14
Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 42 (Aug. 2000).
90. See, e.g., First Enter. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 109, 124 (2004) (a “contracting officer
will normally not perform realism analysis on an offeror’s price—that is, determine whether an
offeror’s price is too low—because the contractor bears the risk of unreasonable estimates in fixed
price contracts” (citing Labat-Anderson, Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 99, 106 (2001)); Grove
Res. Solutions, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-296228, July 1, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 133.
91. The conservative approach may reflect, in part, a reluctance to open another line of protest
that would be so easy to raise against almost any low-priced award; it is very easy, after all, for a
bidder to argue that it lost because the winning bidder’s price was unrealistically low.
92. E.g., Grove Res. Solutions, Inc., 2005 CPD ¶ 133, at 3 (“Although agencies are required to
perform some sort of price or cost analysis on negotiated contracts to ensure that proposed prices
are fair and reasonable, where, as here, the award of a fixed-price contract is contemplated, a
proposal’s price realism is not ordinarily considered, since a fixed-price contract places the risk
and responsibility for contract costs and resulting profit or loss on the contractor. However, an
agency may, as it did here, provide in the solicitation for a price realism analysis for such purposes
as measuring an offeror’s understanding of the solicitation requirements, or to avoid the risk of
poor performance from a contractor who is forced to provide goods or services at little or no
profit.”); Puglia Eng’g of Calif., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-297413, B-297413.2, B-297413.3, Jan. 20,
2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 33 (“Where . . . an RFP contemplates the award of a fixed-price contract, an
agency may provide for the use of a price realism analysis for the limited purpose of measuring
an offeror’s understanding of the requirements or to assess the risk inherent in an offeror’s
proposal.”).
93. See FAR 28.102-1.
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retains a significant risk that performance will fail when the Government does
not demand a performance bond. It is that residual, unmitigated risk—one
not addressed by the systemic checks in U.S. procurement—that remains un-
resolved in the U.S. law regarding price realism.94
The UNCITRAL and European models suggest, therefore, that U.S. pol-
icymakers ultimately may need to open the door more broadly to price realism
assessments. The U.S. rules should, of course, guard against agencies’ use of
price realism analysis as a discriminatory “weapon” against low-price entrants
to the federal market. Those concerns regarding potential discrimination
could be addressed, however, by structuring highly transparent procedures for
price realism assessments, including, for example, requiring that solicitations
signal a possible price realism analysis.95 With discrimination checked, and a
broader recognition of the reasons to probe for below-cost pricing, U.S. con-
tracting officials could better address the residual risks that unrealistically low/
below-cost pricing may pose.
To extend our comparative analysis a step farther, by understanding when
procuring officials in developing nations may want to make a more probing
price realism analysis, we may be in a better position to predict when U.S.
procurement officials, for their part, might need to probe price realism more
closely. Procuring agencies in developing nations may require broader dis-
cretion to assess price realism because the systemic elements that protect U.S.
agencies against unrealistically low prices—e.g., vendors’ fear of default ter-
mination, sophisticated systems for assessing vendors’ financial strength, per-
formance security provided by a third party, or a bankruptcy system that fos-
ters project completion—simply do not exist in many developing nations. In
those developing nations, which are much more likely than industrialized
nations to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law, the UNCITRAL Model Law
should, logically, leave procuring officials more flexibility to assess the true
risk posed by strikingly low bids. By the same token, where those systemic
protections are not available to U.S. agencies—when, for example, U.S. agen-
cies engage in fixed-price contracts in unruly markets, without independent
systems to help assure performance—the U.S. rules should, in principle, point
procuring officials toward a more probing assessment of price realism,96 to
94. Cf. Cherry Road Techs., Comp. Gen. B-296915, B-296915.2, B-296915.3, B-296915.4,
B-296915.5, Oct. 24, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 197 (agency not obligated to conduct realism analysis);
YORK Bldg. Servs., Inc., Comp. Gen. B-296948.2, B-296948.2, B-296948.3, B-296948.4,
Nov. 3, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 202, at n.3 (price realism assessment not required of agency even if
agency had concluded that price bid was below cost).
95. Current case law in the United States already contemplates such a signal of an impending
price realism analysis, and that signal gives prospective offerors an opportunity to protest if it
appears price realism might be used to discriminate against low-price offerors.
96. As the GAO has noted, the Federal Acquisition Regulation already affords agencies a
variety of means to assess price realism:
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides a number of price analysis techniques that
may be used to determine whether prices are reasonable and realistic, including comparison
of the prices received with each other; comparison of previously proposed prices for the same
or similar items; comparison with the independent government estimate; and analysis of pricing
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control the performance risk left unmitigated by the normal systemic protec-
tions. At the same time, of course, in balancing contracting officials’ authority
to probe prices, we must be mindful of the transaction costs caused by a
pricing review,97 and of the risk, discussed above, that contracting officials
could use price realism to discriminate against genuinely low-cost suppliers.
V. CONCLUSION
In this first decade of the twenty-first century, U.S. procurement law is
turning a corner: probably for the first time in the modern era, comparative
international assessments are becoming a profoundly useful tool in developing
U.S. procurement rules. As the analysis above reflects, three issues being stud-
ied by UNCITRAL—electronic communications, reverse auctions, and ab-
normally low bidding—offer lessons that are directly relevant to the U.S.
experience:
• With regard to electronic communications, the UNCITRAL delibera-
tions suggest that, while federal procurement has shifted relatively easily
into the electronic age, in the future that smooth progress may stumble
should specialized technologies used in electronic procurement, such as
security tools, prove discriminatory against certain vendors.
• With regard to reverse auctions, the research that has grown out of the
UNCITRAL initiative has shown that the U.S. approach—to foreswear
regulation, and to let the market guide reverse auctions—is probably
unworkable.Without the direction that regulation provides, it is too easy
for agencies to misuse reverse auctions so that, ironically, reverse auc-
tions become anticompetitive, or result in purchases that do not reflect
the best value for the Government. Around the world, other procure-
ment regimes have regulated reverse auctions, if only to ensure that the
right goods and services are bought in the best way, for the best value;
the comparative review suggests quite powerfully that the United States
should do the same.
• Finally, the UNCITRAL initiative, which is probing anew the curious
phenomenon of “unrealistically” low bidding, suggests that U.S. lawmay
have approached this problem too narrowly. Perhaps because they fear
opening the floodgates to a new form of protest, the bid protest forums
in the United States have been reluctant to encourage challenges based
on unrealistically low bids, absent notice in a solicitation that price re-
alism would be weighed in the agency’s evaluation. The U.S. protest
decisions have generally noted that the legal risk of completing perfor-
information provided by the offeror. FAR sect. 15.404-1(b)(2). The nature and extent of an
agency’s price realism analysis ultimately are matters within the sound exercise of the agency’s
discretion, unless the agency commits itself to a particular methodology in a solicitation.
Burns & Roe Servs. Corp., Comp. Gen. B-296355, July 27, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 150, at 5.
97. See, e.g., FAR 15.402(a) (contracting officer should not seek out more cost or pricing
information than is necessary).
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mance rests with the low offeror, and have left it at that, although the
Government in fact retains a real risk that a below-cost bid will result
in failed performance. The UNCITRAL deliberations highlight this re-
sidual performance risk—the risk that the unrealistically low bidder will
be unable to perform—which U.S. law may simply overlook.
As these examples show, although the United Nations’ primary goal in re-
forming the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law is to benefit developing
nations, ironically that effort is yielding many comparative lessons for U.S.
procurement reform. But beyond yielding specific lessons for reform, the
UNCITRAL reform initiative confirms that procurement systems around the
world face remarkably similar problems, and that procurement, like almost
all other disciplines, is “globalizing” at a stunningly rapid pace.
